Abstract: The paper holds the view that the philosophical concept of intersubjectivity should be an important guiding principle for translation studies. According to intersubjective theory, the paper studies the two strategies of domestication and foreignization in translation and points out that neither of the two strategies should be adhered to rigidly and the practice of either should partly depend on the constrained factors in translation and the relationship between them is one of unity of opposites and the influence of either does not concentrate on one way only but two ways or intersubjective. Key words: intersubjectivity; translation; domestication; foreignization I． From a philosophical and psychological perspective, intersubjectivity is predicated upon the possibility of sameness and upon recognition of difference. The intersubjective model of two subjects should exist in reciprocal relation to one another and establish relationships based on intersubjective mutuality, in which each partner encounters the other as an equal subject, not an object. Therein, for example, two people are said to communicate with one another as an I and a Thou if their encounter is determined by immediacy, directness and mutuality, not by domination and dependency or, both partners recognize and respond to the being of the other as a subject. Instead of taking individual autonomy as a goal, intersubjectivity assumes that the individual exists within the context of continuing relationship to others. The issue, then, is not how we dissociate ourselves from others, but rather, how we engage the other in relationship. The merging and loss of individual subjectivities defines the nature of intersubjective relations. Intersubjectivity cannot be motivated by a cycle of domination and dependence. On the contrary, it is a relationship in which the identity of the individual subject is not only confirmed, but is allowed to develop. If intersubjectivity is not prefaced by an acknowledgement of the other’s autonomy, then the potential for mutuality will give way to a relation of domination and control. Reciprocity cannot be achieved through submission, obedience or repression; it relies on the autonomy of individual subjects. Without awareness of difference, reciprocity is not possible, because otherness is reduced to sameness. When others are described as objects for self-realization or as the means to self-discovery and self-recognition, the language of relationships is drained of attachment, intimacy, and engagement. The self, although placed in a context of relationships, is defined in terms of separation. In other words, the possibility of my self-expansion through the other is directly related to equality and mutuality between both partners. Or to put it differently, differences and sameness must exist simultaneously. Intersubjective reciprocity demands that the other subject be seen as different, yet alike and, recognition must always be accompanied by acknowledgement of difference. Recognition of otherness is necessary in order that two persons can continue to exist, each for themselves, in reciprocal relation to each other. The otherness of both partners in relation provides a key understanding to the nature of intersubjective reciprocity. Intersubjective reciprocity must always be predicated upon acknowledgement of the other’s alterity. Without affirmation of difference, the other will become dominated and dependent, or be reduced to a mere third person, one who stands over and against me. By elucidating the interrelation of separateness and togetherness, intersubjectivity provides a framework within which to understand the structure and importance of reciprocity in an intersubjective relation. The turn to an intersubjective way of looking at things leads in the matter of “subjectivity” to a surprising result: the consciousness that is centered, as it seems, in the ego is not something immediate or purely inward. Rather, self-consciousness forms itself on the path from without to within, through the symbolically mediated relationship to a partner in interaction. To this extent, it possesses an intersubjective core; its eccentric position attests to the tenacious dependence of subjectivity upon language as the medium through which one recognizes oneself in the other in a non-objectifying manner. A theory of intersubjectivity must recognize both human plurality and singularity. Acknowledgment of the radical alterity of individuals does not, though, imply that the self and other are completely impenetrable to each other. In my view, subjective and intersubjective theory should not be seen in opposition to one another—as they usually are—but as interrelated ways of understanding the nature of human reality. The crucial point is that they focus on different aspects of conscious experience that are too interdependent simply to be separated from one another. While this may seem obvious, it may have demonstrated the degree of divergence that exists between conceptualizations of the human self in terms of autonomy on the one hand, and relation on the other. The importance of relation to individual existence clearly can not be underestimated. Intersubjectively, individual self-consciousness and intersubjectivity exist simultaneously, so that there is neither the possibility of merging, nor the loss of individual separateness. Intersubjectivity, therefore, bases on caring and mutuality presupposes the capacity for listening, understanding, and resolving conflict and, reciprocity is only possible in so far as there is a willingness and ability to acknowledge the particular needs and desires of the other in his/her otherness. Human experience is at once grounded in a sense of separateness and togetherness, which is both subjective and intersubjective. Only by recognizing the complex interconnections between subjectivity and intersubjectivity can we begin to understand the intrinsic relation between ourselves and other human beings. |
