| （摘要内容经过系统自动伪原创处理以避免复制，下载原文正常，内容请直接查看目录。） 为了促使高管人员与股东好处坚持分歧，德语论文，可采取股权鼓励。可行的情势有股票期权、股票增值权和限制股。为了改良德国的公司管束状态，司法和律例公布并划定了新的对于若何恰当地制订和肯定高管人员待遇的指点方针。对于《治理层补偿得体性法(VorstAG)2017》划定了运用历久导向的高管鼓励筹划。为了知足这个请求其实不断进步全体公司管治，股权鼓励筹划的运用是应当的。本案例研究拔取了最能代表德国股票指数DAX的30家范围最年夜，生意业务最活泼和监察最严厉的公司来停止研究。查询拜访注解在VorstAG法失效一年后，30家DAX指数的企业中只要21家(或70%)企业在2017年的薪酬谢告中运用股权鼓励。在这21家公司中，10例(46。7%)运用股票增值权，6例(28。6%)运用股票期权，5例(23。8%)运用限制股来鼓励高管们持续赓续地增长利润，股息和股票价钱。案例研究指出股权鼓励筹划异常庞杂，缺少尺度化形式，这使得投资者们难以充足认知该公司。第二项研究，用部门事宜研究法在DAX指数企业中随机抽取五家运用股权鼓励筹划的公司来商量现实的股票价钱成长。查询拜访显示，德语论文，在五家个案例研究中有三家公司在引进或转变薪酬系统后的几个月股价下跌；一家股价下跌；另外一家股价根本持平。结论：高管股权鼓励在德国仍处于起步阶段。年夜多半筹划仅仅作为对当局干涉办法的呼应办法实行。高管人员寻求与股东好处分歧性的念头仍较低。今朝，文中30家DAX指数企业运用的股权鼓励筹划及其供给的信息没法适合或充足的被投资者所用。使人诚服的企业构造和鼓励机制以支撑的一个投资决议计划仍未占领主导位置，是以，靠得住的投资报答没法依据现有根据预期。 Abstract: In order to promote the interests of executives and shareholders to adhere to differences, can take equity incentives. The feasible situation has stock options, stock appreciation rights and restricted shares. In order to improve the state of corporate control in Germany, the judiciary and the regulations promulgated and delineated new guidelines on how to properly formulate and affirm the treatment of senior executives. On "appropriateness management compensation method (VorstAG) 2017" designated application oriented executives to encourage long-term planning. In order to satisfy the request, in fact, the continuous improvement of all corporate governance, equity incentive plan should be applied. This case study selected the most representative of the German stock index DAX 30 most of the eve of the scope of business, the most lively and the most stringent supervision of enterprises to stop the study. After a visit to the VorstAG approach to the failure of the act, the 30 companies in the DAX index as long as 21 (or 70%) in 2017, the company's compensation in the application of equity incentive. In these 21 companies, 10 cases (46. (7%) the application of stock appreciation rights, 6 cases (28). (6%) application of stock options, 5 cases (23). 8%) application of restricted shares to encourage executives to continuously increase profits, dividends and stock price. Case studies have pointed out that equity incentive planning is unusually complex, the lack of a standardized form, which makes it difficult for investors to fully aware of the enterprise. Second studies, with the Department of the issue of the DAX index in the company in a random sample of five companies to encourage the use of equity planning to discuss the growth of the real stock price. The survey showed that three of the five case studies in the introduction of a number of Companies in the introduction or change in the pay system for several months after the stock price fell, a stock price fell, the other one is flat. Conclusion: the executive stock option is still in its infancy in Germany. Most planning only as a response to the authorities to intervene in the implementation of the approach. The idea that executives seek to benefit from shareholders is still relatively low. At present, the text of the 30 DAX index companies to encourage the use of equity interest in the planning and supply of information can not be suitable or sufficient to be used by investors. The sincere service the company structure and incentive mechanism to support a investment decision plan is still occupied a dominant position, to reliable investment return not on the basis of the existing according to the expected. 目录: 摘要 5-6 Abstract 6 Ⅰ. Table of Contents 7-9 Ⅱ. List of Figures 9-11 Ⅲ. List of Tables 11-12 Ⅳ. List of Abbreviations 12-15 1 Introduction 15-23 1.1 Problem Definition 15-18 1.2 Research Objective and Significance 18-21 1.3 Thesis Structure and Outline 21-23 Part 1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 23-43 2 Agency Theory 24-35 2.1 Principal-Agent Problems 25-30 2.1.1 Hidden Characteristics and Adverse Selection 27-28 2.1.2 Hidden Actions and Moral Hazard 28-30 2.2 Incentive Contracts 30-33 2.3 Stewardship Theory 33-34 2.4 Agency Problems in the Corporate Context 34-35 3 The Theory of Executive Stock Compensation 35-43 3.1 Focus on Company Profitability 36-37 3.2 Budgetary and Labor Market Discipline 37-38 3.3 Executive Stock Compensation 38-41 3.3.1 Development of Concepts and Forms 38-39 3.3.2 Stock Options 39-40 3.3.3 Other Forms of Equity-Based Compensation 40-41 3.4 Positive and Negative Effects on the Firm 41-43 Part 2: FOCUS ON GERMANY 43-102 4 The German Corporate Governance System Revisited 44-55 4.1 The German Stock Corporation Act 45-50 4.1.1 The Management Board 45-47 4.1.2 The Supervisory Board 47-50 4.2 The German Corporate Governance Code 50-53 4.2.1 The Management Board 51-52 4.2.2 The Supervisory Board 52-53 4.3 Specialties of the German Governance Model 53-55 5 The Legal Framework for Executive Stock Compensation 55-63 5.1 On Remuneration in Germany in General 56-57 5.2 On Remuneration Disclosure in Germany 57-60 5.3 On Remuneration Appropriateness in Germany 60-63 6 Case Studies 63-102 6.1 The German Stock Market 64-69 6.2 Equity-Based Compensation in German DAX Companies 69-86 6.3 Discussion 86-92 6.4 Stock Price Developments of Selected Companies 92-102 Part 3: CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 102-106 7 Conclusion 103-104 8 Avenues for Future Research 104-106 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 106-107 REFERENCES 107-111 APPENDIX 111-119 卷内备考表 119 |
