Chinese Military Modernization and Its Implications for Taiwan Chinas economy is now four times the size of Taiwans（$1.2trillion versus about$300billion）35and is growing faster （if you believe the official Chinese governmentdata，which some analysts find suspect）。That eco-nomic disparity could，atleast theoretically ，be turned into a military disparity.But according to thePentagon，Taiwans strategy is to enhance key aspects of its military capa-bilitiescounterblockadeoperations，air superiority over the Taiwan Strait ，法语毕业论文，and defense against amphibiousand aerial assault on the islandand buy time for posi-tive political changes tooccur in China that will ease tensions with Taiwan.36The Taiwanese certainly coulddo more than they currently do to ensure their security.Defense expenditures haveactually been declin-ing as a percentage of Taiwanese government spending.TheTaiwanese fail to do more to enhance their own defenses because they believe thatthe United States will come to their aid if a crisis occurs with China.AlthoughU.S.policy is ambiguous on that point，President Bush made it less ambiguous bysaying the United States would do whatever it took to defend Taiwan ，and，in1996，President Clinton sent two U.S.aircraft carriers into the Taiwan Straitafter the Chinese splashed missiles there to intimidate Taiwan. President Bushs pledge to do whatever it takes to defend Taiwan is dubious.The security of Taiwan has never been vital to the United States，and dueling witha nuclear-armed power in any crisis over the small island would be ill-advised.In any conflict between China and the United States over the island ，escalationto nuclear war is a pos-sibility.Although the United States possesses thousandsof nuclear warheads that could hit China and the Chinese have only about 20warheadsthat can reach the United States，法语论文题目，China cares much more about Taiwan than does theUnited States and could even be irrational about the issue. During the 1996crisis in the Taiwan Strait ，after the United States deployedtwo aircraft carriers near Taiwan ，a Chinese official told Chas Freeman ，a formerU.S.diplomat ，that the Chinese were prepared to use nuclear weapons against theU.S.West Coast if the United States intervened on behalf of Taiwan.37Although comingto the defense of a fellow democracy against an authoritarian Chinese regime hasemotional appeal，U.S.policymakers have to ask themselves whether they are willingto trade Los Angeles to save Taipei.The answer should be a resounding no.The UnitedStates should sell Taiwan the arms it needs for self-defense but should not guar-antee its security.Besides ，Taiwans security is not as hopeless without U.S.assistance as many analysts and press articles make it seem.Hostile behavior towardTaiwan could dis-turb Chinas increasing economic linkage with the rest of the worldespeciallygrowing com-mercial links with Taiwan.Because Chinas highest priority is economicgrowth，the dis-ruption of such economic relationships is a dis-incentive foraggressive Chinese actions vis——vis Taiwan.Any attack short of invasion（usingmissiles or instituting a naval blockade）would likely harm the Taiwanese economyand dis-rupt Chinese trade and financial contacts with Taiwan and other developednations without getting China what it most wantscontrol of Taiwan.An amphibiousinvasionin the unlikely event that it succeededwould provide such control but wouldcause even greater dis-ruption in Chinas commercial links to devel-oped nations. Amphibious Assault An amphibious assault on Taiwan is the least likely Chinese military optionbecause of its low probability of success.Even with-out U.S.assistance ，theTaiwanese have the advantage of defending an island.An amphibious assaultthat is，attacking over water and landing against defended posi-tionsis one of the hardestand most risky military operations to execute.In the Normandy invasion of 1944，the Allies had strategic surprise ，air and naval supremacy，crushing naval gunfiresupport ，and a ground force coming ashore that was vastly superior in numbersto that of the Germans.Yet even with all those advantages，the Allies had somedifficulty establishing beachheads.In any amphibious assault on Taiwan ，Chinawould be unlikely to have strategic surprise，air or naval supremacy（Taiwaneseair and naval forces are currently superior to those of the Chinese ），38or sufficientnaval gunfire support ，and its landing force would be dwarfed by the Taiwanesearmy and reserves.Also ，China has insufficient amphibious forces ，dedicatedamphibious ships to carry them to Taiwans shores，and naval air defense to protectan amphibious flotilla from Taiwans superior air force.According to the study bySwaine and Mulvenon of RAND ，Mainland China will likely remain unable to undertakesuch massive attack over the medium-term，and perhaps，over the long-term as well.39Inaddition，probably for the next two decades，Chinas lack of an integrated airdefense system could leave its homeland open to retaliatory attacks by the Taiwaneseair force ，which could deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan in the first place.Inthe long term ，even if China overcomes those deficiencies and Taiwan lags behindChina in military improvements，the Taiwanese could use a porcupine strategy againsta superior foe.That is ，the Taiwanese armed forces would not have to be strongenough to win a war with the Chinese mili-tary ；they would only have to be ableto inflict enough damage to raise the cost of a Chinese invasion significantly.In this regard，Taiwan may be helped by modern technology.Sea mines ，precision-guidedmunitions （includ-ing anti-ship cruise missiles ），and satellite reconnaissance，which makes surprise diffi-cult，may render any amphibious assault an exceptionallybloody affair.In fact，some defense analysts believe that such technology hasmade large-scale amphibious assaults a thing of the past. Naval Blockade |
