Department of Political Science University of Southern California Los Angeles，Clifornia 90089-0044E-MAIL ：rosen@rcf.usc.edu PROLOGUE "‘If only 1%of the people go and you only charge one-fiftieth of the admissionthat you‘d charge here，you still get to some pretty big numbers ，‘said Logsdon，who estimated that Hollywood would reap tens of millions of dollars from a moreopen Chinese market early on."（Entertainment analyst Jeffrey Logsdon of SeidlerCos.in Los Angeles ，in Alan Citron and Claudia Eller ，"Hollywood Moves to ColonizeChina ，"Los Angeles Times ，April 26，1994，p.D4）。 "Who knows if they will enforce it？The way things work over there ，negotiationsare incredibly protracted.They could not cooperate with you and you wouldn‘t evenknow it."（A studio official at MGM who spoke on condition of anonymity on hisreaction to a Chinese ban on cooperation with three Hollywood studios.The ban stemmedfrom a memo from China‘s Ministry of Radio，Film and Television that singled out"Seven Years in Tibet"（Columbia Tristar），"Kundun"（Disney）and "Red Corner"（MGM/United Artists）as films that "viciously attack China [and]hurt Chinesepeople‘s feelings."（Sharon Waxman ，"China Bans Work with Film Studios ，"TheWashington Post ，November 1，1997，p.C1）。 The quotations above neatly encapsulate the hopes ，uncertainties and disappointmentsof the Hollywood studios in their dealings with China.The market beckons ，asalways，but the Chinese government‘s "interference"in the market，法语论文，often seenas arbitrary if not "inscrutable，"continues to prevent Hollywood from "reaping"the profits Logsdon predicted. INTRODUCTION By the early 1990s the Chinese film industry was facing a serious crisis.Accordingto one source ，attendance at Chinese theaters had dropped from 21billion in 1982to just under 4.5billion in 1991.（1）Compounding the problem，new entertainmentoptions began to flower following Deng Xiaoping‘s "Southern Tour"in early 1992.Karaoke bars，discos ，video parlors，pirated videos ，and other previouslyrestricted forms of leisure were providing intense competition to Chinese cinemas.（2）Desperate for a solution to the problem，yet unwilling and unable to relaxideological restrictions forbidding the sure-fire Western formulas of sex and violence，the authorities introduced a series of limited measures in 1992.Zhang Yimou‘s films"Judou"and "Raise the Red Lantern"had their bans lifted.A large-scale film festivalheld in Changchun awarded Zhang‘s new film，"The Story of Qiu Ju ，"its highestaward ，法语论文题目，and leading Party officials，to show their support，arranged a well-publicizedpreview in the Great Hall of the People.（3） It was only after the 14th Communist Party Congress in October 1992，however，that a number of "capitalist-style"reforms aimed at decentralizing the marketingand distribution of films were introduced in an effort to revive the film industry.Key Central documents issued in 1993（Document No.3）and 1994（Document No.348）are considered the start of the structural reform of the Chinese film industry.Although the new regulations provided no panacea and many problems still remained，these documents began to break the distribution monopoly of the China Film Corporation，allowing Chinese film studios to distribute their films through local units.（4） As the audience for mainland films was falling dramatically ，Hong Kong videosand laserdiscs began to flood the market.With inflation running as high as 20percentin the major cities in 1992-93，and state support less and less forthcoming，China‘sfilm professionals were compelled to adopt new strategies -for example to lookabroad for finance，to attract co-productions financed through Hong Kong ，orto produce and direct television series -in an effort to survive.Indeed ，asone informed observer noted ，the larger studios in Beijing and Shanghai were survivingonly by turning themselves into service centers for productions financed from HongKong or Taiwan.（5）In his yearly summary for Variety Derek Elley noted thatdomestic film production fell in 1993by 50percent （in terms of movies screened）；attendances fell by 60percent；box office grosses fell by 35percent；andrentals fell by 40percent.（6）The Chinese film market -from production toexhibition -was "in desperate need of major long-term investment".（7） Hollywood‘s time had finally come.Years of discussions had always met withfirm Chinese resistance to go beyond a willingness to accept a small number of Hollywoodfilms each year for a flat fee of $30，000-$50，000per film.（8）In the new，market-driven environment ，however，the China Film Export and Import Corporation，which controls all imports，announced that China would release ten "excellent"foreign films a year，on a revenue-sharing basis.Even Xinhua，the official governmentnews agency ，gushed that "an end is in sight to the 40-year-old tradition of buyingout-dated and low-grade but cheap foreign movies."（9）This chapter examines Hollywood‘srelationship with China from the first imported "megaproduction"（dapian）-"TheFugitive"-which opened in Beijing on November 12，1994until late summer 2000.Over the course of almost six years and 46imported American films，the relationshiphas ebbed and flowed，with alternating periods of optimism and pessimism on eachside.In the complex account to follow，however，several conclusions will be documented.First ，despite the obvious problems that have marked and continue to affect therelationship，Hollywood and the Chinese film industry will remain locked in anuneasy embrace.By all indications，they appear to need each other.Second ，Hollywoodwas invited in at a time when the Chinese film industry was facing a dire crisis；questions were being raised about its very survival.By summer 2000，with China‘simminent entrance to the World Trade Organization （WTO ）on the horizon ，theChinese media were raising similar questions about the survival of the Chinese filmindustry.One well-known director entitled his article on the future of Chinesefilm，"To Be or Not to Be？"（10） |
