作 者：朱新光 马超 邹易 ZHU Xinguang, MA Chao, ZOU Yi （1.Shanghai Normal University, Shanghai, 200234, China） 机构地区：上海师范大学,上海200234 出 处：《太平洋学报》2017年第8期77-85,共9页Pacific Journal 基 金：上海市哲学社会科学中青班项目：东亚一体化探讨（201729b012）. 摘 要：本文应用双层博弈论原理,通过对国际协定执行中国内的偏好结构、作用力、转型深度等三个变量,以及一个干预变量--利益集团对博弈的平衡的模型建构,并结合泰国和马来西亚两国对AIA协定和CEPT协定执行情况的对比略论认为：（1）东盟成员国国内的利益偏好分化是作用国际协定能否恰当执行的重要变量。（2）东盟成员国的利益集团在国内政治中进行再分布,直接导出国际协定执行力的再分配。（3）东盟成员国的转型深度决定国际协定执行力的走向。The paper, in which the Two-level-Games theory is applied, constructs the model by three variables that be defined in carrying on international agreement named the domestic preference structure, the influence and the transition depth, and by an intervening variable that interest groups can keep game information balance. The comparative analysis of the implement about AIA and CEPT in Thailand and Malaysia shows that, （ 1 ） Interest preference division between ASEAN members is an important variable that affects the proper execution of national agreement. （2） ASEAN members＇ interest groups redistribute their influence in the domestic politics directly which leads to redistribute the implement of international agreement. （3） The transition depth of ASEAN members decides the direction of the international agreement. ，泰语论文网站，泰语论文题目 |
