网范文：“Informational warfare” 最近的实证和理论探讨表明,人的名声是一个重要中介。在进化过程中,女性可能经历了比男性更会促进竞争,因为女性对名声的要求可能比男性更脆弱，对于人类社会组织，一个重要的和有作用力的调查，英语论文范文，关于灵长类动物,与其他灵长类动物相比,男性对垄断的人类社会，定期开展和平合作朝着共同的目标。这样的观察看似平淡。下面的范文进行详述。
名声是人类社会性的几个理论的核心。间接互惠理论的好处是提供一个基于她的过去的信息贡献他人,在接到受益集团成员。个人可以增加他们的可能性，英语毕业论文，在生病或受伤时,慷慨地提供好处。下面的范文讲述了这一问题。
Abstract
Recent empirical and theoretical work suggests that reputation was an important mediator of access to resources in ancestral human environments. Reputations were built and maintained by the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information about the actions and capabilities of group members—that is, by gossiping. Strategic gossiping would have been an excellent strategy for manipulating reputations and thereby competing effectively for resources and for cooperative relationships with group members who could best provide such resources. Coalitions (cliques) may have increased members’ abilities to manipulate reputations by gossiping. Because, over evolutionary time, women may have experienced more within-group competition than men, and because female reputations may have been more vulnerable than male reputations to gossip, gossiping may have been a more important strategy for women than men. Consequently, women may have evolved specializations for gossiping alone and in coalitions. We develop and partially test this theory.
Introduction
An important and influential survey situating human social organization within the broader matrix of primate social organization found that, in contrast to other primates, males have a virtual monopoly on individual and coalitional violence in human societies. Though there is some evidence for individual aggression by women, there is almost no evidence that women form coalitions to attack other women (Rodseth, Wrangham, Harrigan, and Smuts 1991a; see also Keeley 1996). Rodseth et al.’s survey concluded that women’s relationships, unlike those of females in other primates, seem to be characterized by high degrees of noninterference mutualism, i.e., cooperation that does not impose a cost on any ‘third party.’
This varies little with residence pattern, so that even unrelated women in the most extreme patriarchal societies…regularly engage in peaceful cooperation toward common goals with close and enduring friendships (e.g., Abu-Lughod 1986). Such an observation would seem mundane if it were not for the striking contrast with dispersing females in other primates. We present here a theory at some variance with this view. Although we agree that women seldom cooperate to physically attack other women, we will argue that they regularly cooperate to attack other women’s reputations and to defend their own reputations. As Rodseth et al. (1991b) briefly noted, both men and women may “[gang] up verbally rather than physically on third parties,” an observation that we expand upon considerably here. We will develop our theory, summarize the existing evidence, present new evidence in support of it, and finally compare it to similar and opposing theoretical approaches.
Reputation, information, and competition
Recent empirical studies suggest that reputation—information about an individual based on his or her past behavior—may be an important mediator of access to resources in small, kin-based societies (e.g., Chagnon 1988; Gurven, Allen-Arave, Hill, and Hurtado 2017; Hawkes 1991, 1993; Hawkes, O’Connell & Blurton Jones, 2017; Marlowe 1999; Patton, 2017; Smith & Bliege Bird 2017; Sosis 2017; Sugiyama and Chacon 2017). Reputation has also been shown to predict contributions in experimental economics games (e.g., Milinski, Semmann, Bakker, and Krambeck 2017; Milinski, Semmann, and Krambeck 2017; Wedekind and Milinski 2017). Reputation is central to several theories of human sociality. In the indirect reciprocity theories (Alexander 1987; Leimar and Hammerstein 2017; Nowak and Sigmund 1998), benefits are provided to an individual based on information about her past contributions to others in the group—generous individuals are rewarded by receiving benefits from group members. In the ‘health-insurance’ theories (Gurven et al. 2017; Sugiyama and Chacon 2017), individuals can increase the likelihood that they will be taken care of when ill or injured by generously providing benefits to group members when they are well. In the ‘show-off’ or ‘costly-signaling’ theories (Gintis et al. 2017; Hawkes 1991, 1993; Smith & Bliege Bird 2017), individuals engage in behavior—such as big-game hunting—that reliably signals their quality as mates or social partners, and consequently reap valuable mating or social benefits. 2
In each of these models, as several authors have noted (e.g., Enquist and Leimar 1993; Leimar and Hammerstein 2017), information about key behaviors (such as generosity to others or a successful hunting expedition) must be reliably transmitted to group members. The show-off/costly signaling and health insurance models assume that the key behaviors will be directly observed by those who ultimately provide benefits. Although direct observations are obviously informative in the indirect reciprocity models, key behaviors may also be communicated to other group members by the few observers of individual acts of generosity. Even in the show-off/costly signaling models, most group members will not directly observe who killed the elephant, but will have to rely on s (as well as seeing the dead elephant) to properly assign credit to the successful hunter(s).
Further, although the health insurance models posit that beneficiaries of past generosity will have a fitness interest in caring for providers when they are injured, it would be reasonable to extend this model in the following way: it would be in the fitness interests of all potential beneficiaries to care for an injured provider (even if some had not been personal beneficiaries in the past), because they could benefit from the future generosity of the provider when she is well. In this extended version, information about individual acts of generosity must be transmitted to other group members by observers of these acts. Reputation can also play an important role in reciprocal altruism models (e.g., Cox, Sluckin, and Steele 1999; Enquist and Leimar 1993; Pollock and Dugatkin 1992). It would obviously be beneficial for individuals to know whether future social partners had defected or cooperated in the past with other social partners.
In more sophisticated versions of these models, if the values of benefits that individuals provide vary, then individuals should attempt to cooperate with those who can provide the greatest benefits at the lowest cost. Because cooperation with one individual may necessarily preclude cooperation with another, individuals may have to compete for cooperative partners, resulting in a market for cooperators (Bull and Rice 1991; Nöe 1992; Nöe and Hammerstein 1994; Nöe, Van Schaik, and Van Hoof 1991); these markets have been argued to be particularly important in humans (e.g., Dugatkin 1995; Gilbert 1997; Hagen 1995; Henrich and Gil-White 2017; Tooby and Cosmides 1996). Thus, providers of valuable benefits can themselves be commodities over which individuals compete.
To maximize the benefits one can acquire from others, one must achieve and maintain a reputation for being able to provide valuable benefits to others; this process requires that information about one’s capabilities be transmitted to other group members. Note that individuals may have different reputations in different markets; for example, a woman may be avoided as a foraging partner, but sought after as a political partner. Reputation is multidimensional. Both theory and empirical studies strongly suggest that, within groups, access to resources provided by others is mediated by reputation; we therefore propose that individuals can compete for scarce resources using information to attack their opponents’ reputations and defend their own. 3
We term this informational aggression. We further propose that groups of individuals may be more effective than lone individuals in attacking and defending reputations. We term a coordinated effort to use information to attack and defend reputations informational warfare. Though informational warfare may occur between communities, we will focus on informational warfare by coalitions, or cliques, within communities. Because some actions can benefit one individual at a cost to another—such as cheating on a spouse—having a reputation as, say, a faithful wife, would serve not only to maintain access to resources but also to avoid the severe costs that the injured party, such as the husband, might impose. Thus, a successful attack on a competitor’s reputation could not only deny them resources, but also expose them to severe costs. Among the Jivaro, for example, punishment of infidelity customarily included execution of the paramour and gashing the wife’s head with a machete blade (Harner 1973:107, 175; Newman 1983:169; cited in Dean 1995; see also Daly and Wilson 1988:202-208).
Informational aggression
Individuals’ abilities to provide benefits are not always easily discerned by other group members, but must be inferred from information that, in many instances, is scarce. For example, evaluating a mate’s potential fidelity requires information relevant to fidelity, such as number of prior sex partners, flirtatiousness, prior fidelity, etc., information that could be acquired by gossip. Like Barkow (1992), we view ‘gossip’ as information that had implications for individuals’ fitness-relevant social strategies in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA). For the purposes of this , however, we will more narrowly operationalize gossip as the collection, analysis, and strategic dissemination of information relevant to reputation, with the aim of increasing one’s reputation relative to one’s competitors (we will use the terms ‘gossip’ and ‘informational aggression’ interchangeably). If reputation mediated access to social partners and the resources they provided, there would have been a strong selection pressure for the evolution of adaptations to attack and defend reputations with gossip by providing information to resource providers that impugned the reputation of competitors or enhanced one’s own reputation, and by withholding information that enhanced the reputation of competitors or damaged one’s own.()
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