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Psychology is relevant to judging moral theories. Ever since G. E. Moore’s discussion of the naturalistic fallacy (1903), many philosophers have denied this, but the charge of irrelevancy overlooks the fact that the assumptions on which a moral position rests often include non-moral elements. If the non-moral bits are wrong, the moral position will often be undermined. This concerns some of the descriptive assumptions of value pluralism and absolutism, and the prospects for cognitive science evaluating those assumptions. Pluralism’s descriptive assumptions are that there are moral conflicts and that they sometimes cannot be resolved in a way which all participants would find fully persuasive. Possibly, I could never be persuaded that the moral principles recognized in some other culture reflect obligations, even if I can understand to an extent (empathetically or rationally) how others might think that they do, and that at least some of the members of that other culture find themselves in the same position with regard to my principles. Expose all of us to the relevant non-moral facts as much as you will, have us engage in civil debate appealing to reason as best we can, boost our respective intelligences as far as humanly possible or select among us equally for moral genius, resolution would nonetheless not occur. Either each side would see nothing compelling in the other’s values, or they would perceive something compelling, but it would not be enough to persuade them to change their values. Richard Brandt usefully distinguishes three claims comprising “moral relativism” (1968), although his “moral relativism” is what I here call “pluralism.” The claims are: that there are conflicting moral judgments; that there is no method for resolving these conflicts that all would find persuasive; and that these conflicts reflect conflicting obligations. Only the third claim is wholly normative, the other two being open to empirical scrutiny. Let us consider pluralism and absolutism more closely to see how cognitive science can be relevant in judging them. Defining Moral Diversity and Pluralism In defining pluralism, it is useful to note that some moral principles are more basic for an agent than others. One may hold to the principle that it is wrong to gossip maliciously, but this would not be a basic moral principle for a typical person. For most agents, the prohibition against malicious gossip probably flows from some more general principle, (say) that suffering should be minimized, in conjunction with some descriptive claim, (say) that malicious gossip runs a great risk of increasing suffering. A moral principle is basic for an agent if the agent would not try to justify it by appeal to any other moral principle (whether in conjunction with a descriptive claim or not) (Brandt, 1984). According to strong moral pluralism, for any humanly possible basic moral principle, it is humanly possible that there is some other basic moral principle which conflicts with it such that there would be no unanimous consent for resolving the dispute no matter how much information, time, and leisure were available. The expression “humanly possible” is used to show that mature, biologically normal humans are at issue. “Unanimous consent” refers to the community of all humans and obviously indicates an ideal, since a conference of our whole species is infeasible. The second occurrence of the phrase “it is humanly possible” is italicized to stress that this strong pluralism can be true even if there is some basic moral principle which everyone happens to accept. It is the mere possibility of irresolvable conflict which pluralism requires. Furthermore, the word “any” is italicized to stress that there is no humanly possible basic principle immune to such challenge. In other words, there are no moral absolutes. That is the point of strong pluralism. Conclusion The point of this discussion has been to use recent advances in cognitive science to evaluate some of the descriptive assumptions behind relativism, pluralism, and absolutism. The argument for accepting Berlin’s distinction between relativism and pluralism, despite the fact that what Berlin means by “pluralism” is what some philosophers mean by “relativism,” is that the distinction is valid: There is a difference between finding someone else’s values comprehensible as motives or reasons, even though one rejects them, as opposed to finding them incomprehensible or comprehensible merely causally. It is the difference between recognizing a possibility of reasoned discussion versus simply recognizing difference and then having to decide whether to live with that difference or destroy it. The latter possibility, relativism, may exist between different species or between mentally normal people versus psychopaths, but it does not characterize what one normally thinks of as moral diversity. Neither Fiske’s view nor Kropotkin’s allows for relativism. The upshot of the considerations raised here is that relativism is probably false. The cognitive science of moral judgment does not appear to be advancing in a relativist direction. Furthermore, the tendency toward convergence in moral dialogue argues for some degree of absolutism. What pluralism there is, is not strong but weak. Hence, Berlin’s emphatic plea for pluralism is probably exaggerated. There is, however, some evidence that Berlin’s pluralism was weak after all, that he did recognize some absolutes (Galipeau 1994: 65-8, 82). In that case, thereis less disagreement between Berlin and the conclusion reached here, although one would still wonder why Berlin stressed diversity so much. The present conclusion about pluralism is very near to Brandt’s attitude toward what he called “relativism,” which was actually just his term for pluralism: “Relativism as an emphasis is misleading, because it draws attention away from the central identities, from widespread agreements on the items we care most about” (quoted in Beauchamp, 1982: 38-9). That remark seems to hold true of pluralism to the extent, if any, that it is true: There are irresolvable moral conflicts, not only between cultures, not only between people, but even within the individual’s breast. But to focus too much on these clashes is to overlook the extent to which absolutism is true of the things we care about most. Many of these conclusions are tentative, but I hope I have at least shown that advances in cognitive science are relevant to deciding how far pluralism or absolutism is true. Parametric structure, which plausibly underlies syntax, gives some idea of how pluralism might be true. The cognitive mechanisms underlying mathematical intelligence give some idea of how far absolutism is right. Advances in cognitive science should help us better understand the extent to which we are inevitably divided and how far we are potentially harmonious in our values.()，英语论文题目，英语论文范文 |
