Generosity as a central virtue in Nietzsche's ethics范文[英语论文]

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范文:“Generosity as a central virtue in Nietzsche's ethics ” 尼采的道德是一种美德。用他自己独特的方式,按照他的人生观来构造,尼采的某些美德,也提到自由概念。这篇哲学范文讨论了尼采的慷慨的美德。慷慨的美德在尼采哲学的伦理学中起着核心影响。尼采认为,真正高贵的或道德的人是将怨恨和悔恨放在生活之外的人,他的生命一直在充实和丰富。尼采试图重新点燃和恢复贵族感伤的距离,英语论文,作为道德生活的真正起源。这种痛苦的距离主要源于自尊,灵魂高尚的人本身。

对尼采来说,这意味着一个人应该意识到多样性的自己,这对自己来说是一种形式,忽视自己的多重性。尼采也指这是一个转变的过程,让自己的风格存在。尼采至关重要的是,一个人应该满意自己。下面的范文将进行阐述。

Abstract 
Nietzsche's ethics is basically an ethics of virtue. In his own unique way, and in accordance with his extra-moral view of life, Nietzsche recovers and re-appropriates certain virtues – notably pagan, aristocratic virtues – as part of his project to reconceptualise (‘rehabilitate’) the virtues in terms of virtù (virtuosity and vitality), to which he also refers as his ‘moraline-free’ conception of the virtues. The virtue of generosity (in the sense of magnanimity) plays a central role in Nietzschean ethics. According to Nietzsche, the truly noble or virtuous person is one who lives beyond resentment and feelings of remorse and guilt. He lives his life from the fullness and plenitude of his own being and what he is able to bestow on others. Nietzsche seeks to rekindle and rehabilitate the aristocratic ‘pathos of distance’ as the true origin of ethical life. This pathos of distance basically emanates from self-respect: ‘The noble soul has reverence for itself’ (1974b: §287). 

For Nietzsche, this means that one should realize the greatest multiplicity of drives and form-giving forces in oneself, in the most tension-fraught but ‘controlled’ manner. This control, this imposing a form on oneself without neglecting the multiplicity in oneself, is a creative, artistic activity. Nietzsche also refers to this as a process of transforming the self into a work of art, of giving style to one's own existence. Thus we free ourselves from guilt, resentment and the rage against contingency. It is of the utmost importance for Nietzsche that one should attain satisfaction with oneself, for ‘only then is a human being at all tolerable to behold. Whoever is dissatisfied with himself is continually ready for revenge, and we others will be his victims, if only by having to endure his ugly sight.’ (1974a: §290). To attain satisfaction with oneself ultimately means to affirm life in its totality. This implies a life beyond resentment, i.e. a life that is characterised by generosity or magnanimity (megalopsychia, magnanimitas), which is for Nietzsche the ‘crown’ of all the virtues.

Nietzsche's extramoral (außermoralische) view of life: Rehabilitating the virtues Only after we have recognized everything as lies and appearance do we regain the right to this fairest of falsehoods, virtue ... only by exhibiting virtue as a form of immorality do we again justify it (Nietzsche, 1968: §328). The aim of this article is to highlight the important role played by the virtue of generosity in Nietzsche's extra-moral, ‘aristocratic’ ethics. Nietzsche's ethics is basically an ethics of virtue. In his own unique way, and in accordance with his extra-moral view of life, Nietzsche recovers and re-appropriates certain virtues – notably pagan, aristocratic virtues – as part of his project to reconceptualise (‘rehabilitate’) the virtues in terms of virtù (virtuosity and vitality), to which he also refers as his ‘moraline-free’ conception of the virtues.

Generosity as the crowning virtue 
If one is to choose a single word or concept that would best capture Nietzsche's under- standing of virtue, then the concept of ‘generosity’ (in the sense of ‘magnanimity’) immediately comes to mind. This concept is of course not at all foreign to the long-standing tradition of virtue ethics. Generosity (megalopsychia, magnanimitas) is often mentioned among the traditional virtues, particularly the so-called pagan (pre-Christian), ‘aristocratic’ virtues. This portrayal of the magnanimous man corresponds with Aristotle's aristocratic conception of excellence, and it was still vividly alive in the ethical thinking of Renaissance writers like Montaigne.12 In Descartes’ treatment of the good life, as developed in the Passions of the Soul, the traditional catalogue of cardinal virtues is boiled down to just one, which he calls la générosité and which seems to have quite a lot in common with the Aristotelian notion of noble-mindedness or magnanimity.13 He too extols it as the crowning virtue, or as he puts it, as the ‘key to all the other virtues and a general remedy for every disorder of the passions’ (Descartes, 1991: art. 161).

In conclusion, and by way of summary, one can state the following about Nietzsche's aristocratic, generous person: He is passionate, egoistic, self-complacent and self-assertive, but at the same time he is also characterised by self-discipline, self-respect, politeness, gratitude, willingness to sacrifice himself and his own interests and, above all, lack of resentment and vengeance. He lives in total affirmation of himself, of the will to power, of life itself. Thus he is necessarily an ‘immoralist’ in the sense that he considers himself to be above the moralist distinction between good and evil, as well as the concomitant feelings of guilt and self-mortification. This does not mean that he is unethical or that he advocates ethical relativism, scepticism or indifference. He most certainly maintains a distinction between good and bad. 

By disciplining and cultivating his passions, and by constantly reassessing and contesting traditional values, he ‘creates’ his own values and ‘stylises’ himself into a person of virtue, i.e. someone who excels or appears to be a virtuoso. Thus he inevitably finds himself in conflict and in a constant struggle (agon) with the ‘other’ – other people but also the ‘other’ in himself. He resists the foundationalist claim that values and virtues have a timeless essence, legislated once and for all by some supra-historical, transcendent power. Instead he firmly believes that values and virtues are inherent to life and its form-giving forces. They are engendered time and again by exceptional individuals, acting within specific contexts and in a way that is exemplary, yet uniquely their own.()

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