网范文：“Russian verbs of spatial orientation ” 概念化的空间关系存在于不同语言,而且呈现出不同的表现形式和特定的认知空间结构，构成许多语言表达式的意义。这篇文学范文讲述的是俄罗斯语言的问题。然而这些底层结构,经常账户等功能,在语言中就不那么明显了,有时很难与一个特定的意义表达其功能。如上述，未能充分解释这些动词的概念来表示，空间定位对象描述相同的大小和形状，可以通过其中的一个动词,但有些限制其使用。
第一个明显的区别，例如动词坐,反映某些认知结构纳入各自的概念与这些词汇项相关。这些结构是认知的结果，分类的经验不同。分类的方式取决于人类如何看待不同的对象。下面的范文进行详述。
The problem
Conceptualization of spatial relations takes different forms in different languages, and certain cognitive spatial structures underlie the meaning of many linguistic expressions, both lexical and grammatical (Kravchenko 1996a). However, these underlying structures that often account for the functional features of such expressions, are not so obvious across languages, and it is sometimes rather difficult to relate the meaning of a particular expression to its function on the basis of common sense reasoning.
Yet definitions such as the above fail to adequately explicate the concepts these verbs stand to represent. Spatial orientation of objects of the same size and shape can be described by either one of these verbs, but there are certain seemingly unpredictable constraints on their usage. The first obvious difference is that only one of these verbs, sit, is explicitly anthropomorphic because of direct reference to a structural part of human body (and, by extension, to any living creature with legs).
Discussion
Examples of this kind show that the meanings of the Russian verbs stand, sit, lie reflect certain cognitive structures incorporated in respective concepts associated with these lexical items. These structures are the result of cognitively categorized experience of different objects of which one of the three spatial orientations can be predicated. The manner of categorization depends on how humans perceive different objects, which are classified on such criteria as size and shape comparability, mobility, the accepted norm (Herskovits 1986), as well as morphological structure in case of living creatures. As is pointed out by Bickerton (1990:53), “categories into which we divide nature are not in nature, they emerge solely through the interaction between the nature and ourselves”. Conceptualization of spatial relations and their subsequent grammaticalization have an experiential basis (Svorou 1988, Heine 1997). Space as an existential domain cognized by man through sensory experiences is characterized by three dimensions.
This property of space, in traditional science believed to be an objective phenomenon, is but a reflection of certain cognitive mechanisms that form the basis of human perception and cognition. As far as natural language goes, the world without man has no dimensions or, rather, the world itself exists only in the realm of ‘human dimension’. It is a well established fact that the basic spatial concepts (UP-DOWN, FRONTBACK, RIGHT-LEFT, CONTAINMENT) are anthropomorphic in many languages of the world (Svorou 1994), and the human body provides the most important model for expressing concepts of spatial orientation (Heine 1997:37ff). The primary dimension is UP-DOWN (“vertical”). This primacy is of a cognitive nature: for man, an upright (standing) position is a canonical situation (Clark 1973), and because, according to Protagoras, “man is the measure of all things”, object perception and conceptualization starts along the UP-DOWN vector. So, in order to use the appropriate verb of spatial orientation, the speaker must decide (a) whether the situation to be described is an instance of a canonical situation, (b) whether the object has, in a canonical situation, a vertical dimension (axis) as a categorial diagnostic feature.
affects its linguistic categorization is not necessarily the longest one. For a fence, length as a physical parameter typically exceeds height in a canonical situation, yet a fence stands, and it lies only when it has been torn down. It means that the object “fence” is conceptualized as possessing an intrinsic vertical axis important for its “fenceness”. The importance of this axis stems from the pragmatic function for which fences are designed as artifacts and from the manner in which man interacts with them.
The interaction pattern establishes what may be called “the canonical use orientation”, or the norm, for most artifacts. For instance, containers designed for storage of flowing materials will typically have a vertical axis as a functionally salient feature accompanied by structural asymmetry (“top-bottom”), regardless of its relative length. This asymmetry is grounded in the container’s function and its canonical orientation: in a prototypical case, the filling or emptying of a container involves the movement of material in space along the UP-DOWN vector. For this reason, a blockshaped jewelry box (which is a container) will stand even if its longitudinal axis is horizontally aligned, whereas a brick (which is not a container) similarly oriented will lie.
If we now look at such objects as apples or tomatoes, we’ll see that they are also characterized by structural asymmetry (top-bottom parts), but this asymmetry is not imposed on them by man pragmatically, through a certain mode of interaction; rather, it reflects their spatial orientation as objects in a natural environment. Man’s interaction with such objects does not require that they have a particular spatial orientation with regard to their intrinsic structural axis, for it usually does not matter from which side or end we begin to eat the fruit. From a human point of view, the sole purpose for existence of many different kinds of fruit and other edible objects is to be eaten. Therefore, although they are often characterized by structural asymmetry with respect to the vertical axis, it is not an existentially/interactionally relevant feature, and this is reflected in language. This fact explains, for example, why a brick-shaped loaf of bread will always lie on the table regardless of its relative spatial orientation.
In a trivial cognitive situation, the locomotive apparatus of insects, though presumed, is not discernible, so they do not stand, but sit. Since stand cannot be assigned to names of small animals and insects as an existential predicate, its function is taken over by sit, with lie left as its counterpart. As a result, if a mouse or a roach lies, the implication is that it is dead. But what about sitting mushrooms, roofs, and pies? Although a mushroom has a “leg”, it can be neither bent nor stretched. Yet, in a canonical situation of interaction (“mushroom hunting”) it is often not structurally obvious, concealed by the mushroom’s cap and surrounding vegetation, thus bringing forth a clear-cut analogy with small animals.
A pie sits in the oven because it has been sat (posazhen) there, and the roof on the hut sits due to metaphorical extension “hat on a head” — > “roof on a house”. Why a hat should sit, as well as do other clothing garments, such as jackets, pants, dresses, etc., is not quite clear, especially in view of the fact that, to appraise the consumer properties of the fabric of which such garments are made, one says “it lies well”, and not “it sits well”. Although I have not yet been able to discover the rationale behind this peculiarity in conceptualization of spatial (orientational) relations, I believe it is motivated and has to do with these objects’ pragmatic function and their users’ experience of these objects. Further query into this matter, particularly a contrastive cognitive analysis of orientation verbs in other languages, may yield revealing insights into the ways human mind works when it comes to conceptualization and categorization of spatial relations.
Conclusion
As I have tried to show, the semantics of Russian verbs of spatial orientation is far from being simple or trivial, as dictionaries would have us to believe. Spatial concepts categorized in these lexical items are complex, they are based on a number of cognitive structures that emerge from different modes of man’s interaction with the environment. It is obvious that scientific knowledge of the world on which traditional semantic analysis is often based, and the resulting scientific/common sense taxonomy one can find in lexicographic definitions, cannot be a reliable basis for identifying conceptual structures that underlie the meaning and, consequently, account for the function of, linguistic expressions.
Meaning is experiential in nature, and its structure reflects human cognitive experiences acquired in the course of interaction with the world. That is why, to use Maturana’s (1970, 1978) famous thesis, “everything said is said by an observer to another observer”. Semantics as the study of meaning cannot do without the study of cognitive (i. e. data processing) mechanisms and principles of conceptual categorization that evolve through interactive experiences, which is to say, pragmatics underlies semantics (Kravchenko 1996b). This understanding has been steadily growing in contemporary linguistic community over the past three decades, and there are signs that a new theoretical conception of language is emerging, tentatively labeled the experiential theory of language. This panel’s discussions are undoubtedly a contribution to its molding.
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