网范文：“One-sidedness bias” 辩证主义直截了当地指出了某种类型的错误推理。这样的谬误在于从一个给定的角度，在考虑一个给定的对象,忽视了相反的观点。这篇范文讲述了片面地观点看待问题。更正式地,在上述背景下,这种谬论包括,当考虑引用类的一个对象，与它相关联的,忽略了观点对应的双极来定义类的引用。我们将术语片面化,关于这种类型的谬论。这种偏见的条件,违反辩证的准则,然而需要澄清。
事实上,在这种情况下,我们可以考虑,忽略了证据的错误推理。在这种情况下,事实上不会犯下错误的片面倾向,因为这是他的内在影响。下面的范文进行详述。
Characterisation
The previous formulation of the principle of dialectical indifference suggests straightforwardly an error of reasoning of a certain type. Informally, such a fallacy consists in focusing on a given standpoint when considering a given object, and of neglecting the opposite view. More formally, in the context described above, such a fallacy consists, when considering an object o and the reference class associated with it, in taking into account the viewpoint of the A pole (respectively Ā), while completely ignoring the viewpoint corresponding to its dual pole Ā (respectively A) to define the reference class. We shall term one-sidedness bias such type of fallacy.
The conditions of this type of bias, in violation of the principle of dialectical indifference, needs however to be clarified. Indeed, in this context, we can consider that there are some cases where the two-sidedness with respect to a given duality A/Ā is not required. Such is the case when the elements of the context do not presuppose conditions of objectivity and exhaustiveness of views. Thus, a lawyer who would only emphasise the evidence in defence of his/her client, while completely ignoring the evidence against him/her does not commit the above-mentioned type of error of reasoning. In such a circumstance, in fact, the lawyer would not commit a faulty one-sidedness bias, since it is his/her inherent role. The same would go in a trial for the prosecutor, who conversely, would only focus on the evidence against the same person, by completely ignoring the exculpatory elements.
In such a situation also the resulting one-sidedeness bias would not be inappropriate, because it follows well from the context that it consists well of the limited role assigned to the prosecutor. By contrast, a judge who would only take into account the evidence against the accused, or who would commit the opposite error, namely of only considering the exculpatory against the latter, would well commit an inappropriate one-sidedness bias because the mere role of the judge implies that he/she takes into account the two types of elements, and that his/her judgement is the result of the synthesis which is made. In addition, as hinted at above, the mention of a reference class associated with the object o proves to be important. In effect, as we will have the opportunity to see it with the analysis of the following examples, the definition itself is associated with an A/Ā duality. And the reference class can be defined either from the viewpoint of A, or from the viewpoint of Ā. Such feature has the consequence that all objects are not likely to give rise to a one-sidedness bias. In particular, the objects that are not associated with a reference class that is itself likely to be envisaged in terms of an A/Ā duality, do not give rise to any such one-sidedness bias.
Before illustrating the present construction with the help of several practical examples, it is worth considering, at this stage, the one-sidedness bias which has been just defined, and which results from the very definition of the principle of dialectical indifference, in the light of several similar concepts. In a preliminary way, we can observe that a general description of this type of error of reasoning had already been made, in similar terms, by John Stuart Mill (On Liberty, II):
He who knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that. His reasons may be good, and no one may have been able to refute them. But if he is equally unable to refute the reasons on the opposite side; if he does not so much know what they are, he has no ground for preferring either opinion. In the recent literature, some very similar concepts have also been described. It consists in particular of the dialectic bias notably described by Douglas Walton (1999). Walton (999, pp. 76-77) places then himself in the framework of the dialectical theory of bias, which opposes one-sided to two-sided arguments: The dialectical theory of bias is based on the idea [...] that an argument has two sides. [...] A one-sided argument continually engages in pro-argumentation for the position supported and continually rejects the arguments of the opposed side in a dialogue. A two-sided (balanced) argument considers all arguments on both sides of a dialogue. A balanced argument weights each argument against the arguments that have been opposed to it.
Instance
To illustrate the above concepts, it is worth at this stage providing an example of the one-sidedness bias. To this end, consider the following instance, which is a form of reasoning, mentioned by Philippe Boulanger (2017, p. 3)3 , who attributes it to the mathematician Stanislaw Ulam. The one-sidedness bias shows up in a deductive form. Ulam estimates that if a company were to achieve a level of workforce large enough, its performance would be paralysed by the many internal conflicts that would result. Ulam estimates that the number of conflicts between people would increase according to the square of the number n of employees, while the impact on the work that would result would only grow as a function of n.
Thus, according to this argument, it is not desirable that the number of employees within a company becomes important. However, it turns out that Ulam's reasoning is fallacious, as Boulanger points it out, for it focuses exclusively on the conflictual relations between employees. But the n 2 relationships among the company employees can well be confrontational, but may include as well collaborative relationships that are quite beneficial for the company. And so there is no reason to favour conflictual relationships with respect to collaborative ones. And when among n 2 relationships established between the company employees, some are genuine collaborative relationships, the effect is, instead, of improving business performance. Therefore, we can not legitimately conclude that it is not desirable that the workforce of a company reaches a large size.
Dichotomic analysis and meta-philosophy
The aforementioned principle of dialectic indifference and its corollary – one-sidedness bias – is likely to find applications in several domains4 . We shall focus, in what follows, on its applications at a meta-philosophical level, through the analysis of several contemporary philosophical paradoxes. Meta-philosophy is that branch of philosophy whose scope is the study of the nature of philosophy, its purpose and its inherent methods.
In this context, a specific area within meta-philosophy is the method to use to attach oneself to resolve, or make progress towards the resolution of philosophical paradoxes or problems. It is within this specific area that falls the present construction, in that it offers dichotomous analysis as a tool that may be useful to assist in the resolution of paradoxes or philosophical problems. The dichotomous analysis as a methodology that can be used to search for solutions to some paradoxes and philosophical problems, results directly from the statement of the principle of dialectical indifference itself. The general idea underlying the dichotomous approach to paradox analysis is that two versions, corresponding to one and the other pole of a given duality, can be untangled within a philosophical paradox.
The corresponding approach then is to find a reference class which is associated with the given paradox and the corresponding duality A/Ā, as well as the two resulting variations of the paradox that apply to each pole of this duality. Nevertheless, every duality is not suitable for this, as for many dualities, the corresponding version of the paradox remains unchanged, regardless of the pole that is being considered. In the dichotomous method, one focuses on finding a reference class and a relevant associated duality, such that the viewpoint of each of its poles actually lead to two structurally different versions of the paradox , or the disappearance of paradox from the point of view of one of the poles. Thus, when considering the paradox in terms of two poles A and Ā, and if it has no effect on the paradox itself, the corresponding duality A/Ā reveals itself therefore, from this point of view, irrelevant.
The dichotomous analysis is not by far a tool that claims to solve all philosophical problems, but only constitutes a methodology that is susceptible of shedding light on some of them. In what follows, we shall try to illustrate through several works of the author, how dichotomous analysis can be applied to progress towards the resolution of three contemporary philosophical paradoxes: Hempel's paradox, the surprise examination paradox and the Doomsday argument. In a preliminary way, we can observe here that in the literature, there is also an example of dichotomous analysis of a paradox in David Chalmers (2017). Chalmers attempts then to show how the two-envelope paradox leads to two fundamentally distinct versions, one of which corresponds to a finite version of the paradox and the other to an infinite version. Such an analysis, although conceived of independently of the present construction can thus be characterized as a dichotomous analysis based on the finite/infinite duality.
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