网范文：“ Credit Rationing and Internal Ratings” 一些实证调查都指向这一事实，高科技企业受到信贷配给程度的作用高于平均水平。这种过度的信贷配给可能不是由于信息不对称,而是信贷机构的缘故。这篇金融范文为这一现象提供了一个模型,并研讨了最近银行的筛选程序变化。特别是,为了强调甄别程序对信贷配给的作用。众所周知,信贷不承认那些提供了最高的利率的申请者，英语论文，英语论文题目，相反承认那些提供最可靠的前景,保证将偿还债务。
从本质上讲,信贷配给是通过增加利率，银行对低利润的项目屏蔽风险。因此,经济理论认为,信贷配给是信息不对称的一个实例。有趣的是,从业者理所当然地认为贷款申请者通常隐藏一些信息,他们相当关心,他们提供的信息的内容。下面的范文进行详述。
Abstract
Some empirical investigations are pointing to the fact that high-tech firms are subject to credit rationing to a higher extent than the average. This excess of credit rationing may not be due to information asymmetries, but rather to the inability of credit institutions to screen projects in novel fields. This article provides a model of this phenomenon and explores its implications in the light of recent changes in the screening procedures of major banks. In particular, the changes to be made in order to comply with the “Basel II” accord emphasize the impact of screening procedures on credit rationing.
Keywords: Credit Rationing, High-Tech Firms, Internal Rating Systems, Basel
Introduction
It is well known that credit is not conceded to those applicants who offer the highest interest rate. Rather, it is conceded to those who offer the most reliable prospects that the debt will be repaied. Essentially, credit is rationed because by increasing the interest rate banks would screen for riskier, less profitable projects [30] [31] [43] [8]. Thus, economic theory sees credit rationing as an instance of asymmetric information. Interestingly, practitioners tend to stress another aspect. Giving for granted that loan applicants typically hide some information, they are rather concerned with the content of the information that they provide. Specifically, they are concerned about the soundness of the projects that they should finance and the ability of their proponents to carry them out. In the limit, one may mention a popular guide for venture capitalists listing such things as a deprived childhood, an absent father, a strong mother and a sense of guilt for having not lived up to parents’ expectations as the hallmarks of successful entrepreneurs [40].
Be these features relevant or not, the crucial issue is that practitioners want to know whether potential borrowers know what they are doing. After discounting for the fact that loan applicants portray a rosy picture of their enterprise, they want to focus on the details of the projects they are asked to finance. These details may be quite easy to specify if the project is presented by a wellacquainted firm that is expanding on a stable technology. On the contrary, it may be a very difficult task when money is demanded for an enterprise of a novel kind, one that has never been undertaken before. Investments often involve novel technologies, and possibly the creation of novel institutions and consumption habits [33]. Being novel, no objective probability distribution of their success can be measured.
Thus, even if information asymmetries would not exist, banks officials would still have a hard time trying to understand whether a potential borrower is a visionary business man or a mad man. Figure 1 illustrates my point with respect to the received theory. Information asymmetries make for a cloud between loan applicants and the bank. The presence of this cloud is a sufficient reason for screening applicants and rationing credit rather than increasing the interest rate until demand equals supply. However, I am claiming that if technological or institutional innovations make for uncertainty, the very information available to loan applicants is cloudy as well. Even a bank disposing of the same information as the loan applicant may neverthelessfeel unable to classify the proposed project in a class of risk. Consequently, it may decide not to make any offer, for no value of the interest rate. Thus, precisely the most innovative firms may experience credit rationing to a larger extent than the average.
Conclusion Credit rationing is one of those issues where the neoclassical model of competitive markets does not apply. Similarly to other market failures, asymmetric information has been suggested as an explanation. Since asymmetric information is sufficient to justify the existence of credit rationing, little effort has been devoted to alternative, or additional explanations. Though a few economists voiced that uncertainty does play a role in credit rationing, this argument has not been pursued in either empirical or analytical terms. The empirical evidence on credit rationing to high-tech firms is questioning this approach, since there is no reason why information asymmetries should be higher if sophisticated technologies are involved.
Furthermore, the new accord on capital requirements (Basel II) is emphasising the importance of bank internal rating systems, a circumstance that triggered many interesting empirical investigations. Both streams of enquiry point to the cognitive difficulties posed by difficult classification problems. The modelling approach presented in this article is innovative, but admittedly tentative and incomplete. Nevertheless, the author deems that it is worth to be presented and discussed in the hope that more information will be disclosed to researchers. The diffusion of computer-based procedures for evaluating loan applications is likely to increase both the need and the feasibility of scientific studies on banks’s internal rating systems and the extent to which they influence credit rationing.()
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