网范文：“Three-state modified voter model for languages ” 标准三态模型是由包括外部压力增大，通过添加一些偏见内部噪声。此外,我们计算出持久性概率,即网站的数量没有改变他们的意见。政治局势在共产主义国家的解体和新出现的主权国家,证明了另一个语言实践，对于地缘政治议程与日益增长的不对称的权力，英语论文范文，英语论文，还有持续的语言和文化资本的积累的作用。在复杂的情况,通常没有一个协议达成，任何试图解决这些现象的复杂性,偶然发现一系列的理论和措施论的问题。
然而,最近的探讨表明,如果个人倾向于分享相似的知识结构在给定的领域,然后选择一个相当稳定的行为。在当前的探讨中,我们将略论地理,语言学,社会学和政治因素等。我们注意到最近的语言略论。下面的范文将进行详述。
ABSTRACT
The standard three-state voter model is enlarged by including the outside pressure favouring one of the three language choices and by adding some biased internal random noise. The Monte Carlo simulations are motivated by states with the population divided into three groups of various affinities to each other. We show the crucial influence of the boundaries for moderate lattice sizes like 500 × 500. By removing the fixed boundary at one side, we demonstrate that this can lead to the victory of one single choice. Noise in contrast stabilizes the choices of all three populations. In addition, we compute the persistence probability, i.e., the number of sites who have never changed their opinion during the simulation, and we consider the case of ”rigid-minded” decision makers.
Motivation and Model
The political situation after the break-up of former communist powers and the emergence of new sovereign states in Europe and elsewhere, justify yet another look at linguistic practices as informed by geopolitical agendas with the ever growing asymmetric power relations and the ongoing struggle for the accumulation of linguistic and cultural capital. Pronounced language asymmetries with highly competitive behaviour have caused a situation in which no successor state can claim a one-and-only homogeneous ”national language” without serious caveats. In complex decision making, there are 1 typically no single agreements when large numbers of decision makers are expected to choose from a large set of alternatives [1]. Any attempts to tackle the intricacies of these phenomena at the more global level, stumble across a series of theoretical and methodological problems. However, more recent studies have shown that if individuals tend to share similar knowledge structures within a given choice domain, then a rather stable global choice behaviour is observed with about 90% probability [2].
In the present study, we shift the analysis of geographical [3], linguistic, sociological and political factors to another [4], while looking here for a model which may describe a type of language competition observed in an environment populated by strong minorities facing several alternative choices and partially bordering on supporting states. We do not intend to discuss whether ”dialects” would be a better name instead of ”languages”, however, we notice that recent linguistic analyses [5] could not trace any dialectal differences following national lines in many of the successor states in e.g. Southeast Europe. Instead, it has been increasingly argued [6] that all different groups in the region tend to use exactly the same idiom. However, the restructured political pictures lead to the emergence of completely new policies, such that the question of language has become a top political issue in a community which is linguistically homogeneous but politically divided [6].
We treat this problem as the one of opinion dynamics where everybody can adopt one of the three choices A, B, and C (each representing the opinion about the linguistic identity), with transitive [7] preference relations. Thus we model the evolution of the global choice behaviour in a tripartite system where due to particular economic and political alliances, languages may happen to be in a closer contact at one point in time and more divided at another. As a consequence, people may start adopting linguistic features or even full languages of their neighbours, if they have sufficient gains or are in- fluenced by a set of social and/or political factors. This is especially valid for those languages which both belong to the same linguistic family and border with one another.
Discussion
In the present , we proposed the generalization of the standard threestate voter model for a linguistically homogeneous but politically divided population with subgroups of different mutual affinities. Starting with this tripartite initial configuration, the Monte Carlo simulations were conducted for different lattice sizes, different amounts of ”advertising” (outside pressure) and asymmetric noise distribution. These simulations lead us to several, nontrivial conclusions. First, the individual preferences for the initially most dominant opinion are more prone to decay given the rather unstable and fuzzy borders with respect to the two other populations with more fixed boundaries and opinions 12 different from the majority.
Thus, we found a substantial importance of the boundary effects for the investigated population when placed on smaller lattices. However, increasing the size of the lattice prolongs the survival of the most dominant opinion. Second, adding some ”advertising” in favour of the dominance state prevents the opinion of the majority from extinction, while considerably increasing its size. In the model, the ”advertising” probabilities refer to the different outside pressures of e.g. the international community in favor of the largest population due to particular reasons. Somewhat counter-intuitively, when noise was added to the process, it reduced the previously observed fluctuations in choice behaviour. The noise parameter in our model can relate to a set of different factors such as marriages and relationships between culturally and linguistically different individuals, unexpected changes of preferences for different political parties with different language policies, or other personal reasons of individual decision makers.
We finally argue that the advantages of our generalized three-state voter model span beyond mere linguistic applications, since the model is able to simulate and characterize the nature of both collective political and linguistic states (i.e. their co-evolution). Moreover, through future comparison with realistic data, we might be able to predict whether and under which conditions various highly-similar languages can stably co-exist, and whether and how the political stability in a given region changes with the ever growing ”linguistic diversity”. Physicists and other computational modelers can significantly contribute to this research domain, by developing tools capable of establishing more isomorphic relations between the model parameters and the realistic traits of languages or opinions in competition.()
网站原创范文除特殊说明外一切图文作品权归所有；未经官方授权谢绝任何用途转载或刊发于媒体。如发生侵犯作品权现象，保留一切法学追诉权。()
更多范文欢迎访问我们主页 当然有需求可以和我们 联系交流。-X()
|
