| （摘要内容经过系统自动伪原创处理以避免复制，下载原文正常，德语论文，内容请直接查看目录。） 本文对自在主义代表人物以赛亚。伯林划分的经典的两种自在概念提出批驳，以为其划分是没有依据的，其学说外部也是歧义层出，德语论文范文，消极自在其实不优于积极自在，更谈不上是真实的自在，割裂二者无助于熟悉真正自在。共和主义者提出一种新的自在不雅――“无安排自在”，号称可以取代前两种划分，以为这才是真实的自在不雅，笔者以为这都是站在经历主义立场上对待自在成绩，所以排挤感性和自在的关系，而不寻求自在面前的超验价值，自在也是没有价值内在的，也只是逗留在最初级的情势中。康德的自律即自在固然使自在有了品德价值，凸显人类的庄严，然则不太关怀实际效果，整体上依然属于消极自在的领域。黑格尔针对康德的自在不雅做出调剂改良，成长出自在认识的三个汗青阶段，使消极自在和积极自在在汗青感性中到达辩证同一，有助于我们更深入地熟悉到自在的概念。最初，针对自在主义号称的广泛主义诉求，作者指出两种意义上的广泛，广泛主义指的是把看待广泛常识的立场扩展到广泛常识以外的范畴，价值成绩不属于广泛常识的规模，任何用看待广泛常识的办法表述所谓广泛价值，不只有实际上难以战胜的艰苦，并且常常和现实生涯脱节，人要依据方圆情况的挑衅而赓续调剂本身的生计状况，与情况赓续调和，达到“性命的自发”，这才是一种真实的自在。 Abstract: This article on the liberal representative Isaiah. The division of Berlin classic two free concept put forward criticism that the division is not the basis, the theory of external is ambiguity, negative free actually no better than positive free, let alone not is true freedom, separates the two helpless to the familiar really free. Republicans proposed a new free indecent -- "without arrangement of freedom", claims to be able to replace the former two division, think this is the true freedom of indecent, I think it is standing on the standpoint towards free performance, so crowding relationship between perceptual and free, and do not seek comfortable in front of the transcendental value, freedom is no value inherent, also just stay in the initial situation. Kant's self-discipline that is free of course has a moral value, highlighting the human dignity, but not too care about the actual effect, as a whole still belongs to the negative freedom of the field. Hegel in Kant's freedom indecent adjust improved, growth from in the understanding of the three historical stages, the negative freedom and positive freedom in the history of perceptual reach the dialectical unity of one will help us to more deeply familiar to the concept of freedom. Initially, for the so-called liberal widespread doctrine demands, the author points out that two kinds of meanings of widely, widespread doctrine is the view position of knowledge widely extended to the scope of knowledge widely outside, value achievement does not belong to the size of the knowledge widely, any see extensive knowledge representation called a wide range of values, not only actually difficult to overcome the hard and often real life disjointed, people want to according to the radius of the provocation and continuously adjust itself to the living conditions, harmonic and ceaselessly, achieve "spontaneous life", this is a real freedom. 目录: 内容摘要 2-3 Abstract 3 引言 5-7 第一章 自由主义自由观和“第三种自由” 7-17 第一节 自由主义自由观及其缺陷――以伯林为例 7-13 第二节 共和主义的“第三种自由”对自由主义自由观的发展――不成功的范例 13-17 第二章 康德自由观的特点及其对自由主义自由观的批判 17-26 第一节 先验的自由与实践自由 17-22 第二节 自律的意义及其对自由主义自由观的突破 22-26 第三章 黑格尔自由观的特点及其和自由主义自由观之异同 26-34 第一节 自由：任意性与必然性 26-30 第二节 自由在历史中的实现及其对自由主义自由观的超越 30-34 第四章 对自由主义所谓的普遍主义的批判 34-41 第一节 普遍的含义――绝对普遍和相对普遍 34-37 第二节 对普遍主义的批判 37-41 参考文献 41-42 后记 42 |
