| 20世纪90年月以来，跟着自在商业的敏捷成长，世界经济区域一体化进入了以双边自在商业为主，多条理自在商业协同成长的新阶段。FTA (Free Trade Area)作为区域一体化的重要标记在全球规模内赓续成长，中国作为全球最年夜的成长中国度也在赓续推动与周边国度和地域的经贸协作，并以积极立场商量与周边国度缔结FTA的可行性。2012年恰逢中韩建交20年，本文拔取研究中韩树立FTA谈中的博弈成绩停止研究，免费韩语论文，对推进中韩经济协作、成长中韩友爱关系和推进东亚经济一体化具有主要的实际意义。在本文参考以往相干的的文献材料中，中韩FTA的成长情形采取归结和归纳法相联合的措施剖析了中韩树立FTA中博弈的作用身分，韩语毕业论文，对相干材料和实际情形停止了研究。文章重要采取定量与定性相联合的剖析办法，经由过程图表对中韩商业、投资情形停止直不雅准确的定量剖析。再经由过程实际剖析与案例剖析相联合的办法研究笼统出来的普通纪律成立与否息争释力强弱。最初得出以下结论：第一，韩国的对外商业政策具有显著的商业掩护偏向，这使中韩商业政策博弈易堕入“阶下囚窘境”；第二，中韩两国商业磨擦一向以来在博弈进程注解，固然中国在对商业磨擦处置的才能方面年夜年夜进步，但韩国整体上的博弈才能依然比我国强许多，在与我国产生的商业磨擦事宜中都是作为茅盾的提议方；第三，跟着国际经济交换的赓续成长与深化，中国和韩国的商业磨擦仍将持续，两边对国际市场占领率的争取仍将持续，随之而来的博弈也仍将持续，由此可以判断中国必需加年夜力度采用强无力的办法来进步本国在争取中的博弈才能。 Abstract: Since the 90 years of twentieth Century, with the rapid growth of free trade, the world economic regional integration has entered a new stage in the development of bilateral free trade, multi level business collaboration. FTA (free trade area) as an important symbol of regional integration in the global scale the ceaseless development, China as the world's biggest growth in China also ceaselessly promote economic cooperation and trade with neighboring countries and regions, and positive attitude to consult with neighboring countries to conclude FTA feasibility. 2012 coincides with China and South Korea established diplomatic relations 20 years, this article selects the research between China and South Korea to establish FTA talks in the performance of game research, to promote economic cooperation between China and South Korea, Nakahan Yuai and promote East Asian economic integration has the important practical significance. In this reference to previous coherent literature materials, growth situation of China Korea FTA take joint resolution and induction phase method analysis of China set up the influencing factor of FTA in the game and on coherent material and the actual situation was studied. The article is important to adopt quantitative and qualitative analysis method, through the process chart to China and South Korea business, investment situation to stop direct and accurate quantitative analysis. Through the actual analysis of the process and case analysis of the way to study the general rules of the establishment of the general discipline and the strength of the fight for the release of information. The first draws the following conclusions: first, South Korea's foreign trade policy has significant commercial cover bias, which makes China and South Korea trade policy game is easy to fall into the "prisoner's dilemma"; second, China and South Korea trade friction has been in the process of the game is to hand in China notes, greatly improve the disposal of trade friction, but the overall game to South Korea the our country is still higher than many, and in China's commercial matters in friction are as Mao Dun's proposal; third, along with the ceaseless development of international economic exchange and deepening, and Chinese South Korea's trade friction will continue, on both sides of the international market occupation rate for the game will continue, it will continue, it can be judged China must increase the intensity of the strong measures to progress in the game to win the country. 目录: 摘要 6-7 Abstract 7 第一章 绪论 9-16 1.1 选题背景及探讨意义 9-12 1.2 探讨内容及措施 12-14 1.3 论文创新点 14-16 第二章 区域经济一体化理论与博弈理论概述 16-24 2.1 自由贸易区相关理论 16-18 2.2 博弈理论概述 18-24 第三章 中韩建立FTA的探讨进程 24-32 3.1 中韩FTA的发展及探讨近况 24-27 3.2 中韩建立FTA的必要性 27-29 3.3 中韩建FTA有待解决的问题 29-32 第四章 中韩建立FTA中的博弈略论 32-40 4.1 谈判战略意愿略论 32-35 4.2 中韩贸易关系博弈模型 35-37 4.3 中韩贸易摩擦的博弈略论 37-40 第五章 结论与建议 40-43 5.1 结论 40-41 5.2 对中韩建立FTA谈判的建议 41-43 参考文献 43-45 谢辞 45 |
