The main purpose of this study is to inquire into the duality of the United States of America’s nuclear policy toward the Republic of Korea through the prism of the bilateral agreements concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to explore a pos... The main purpose of this study is to inquire into the duality of the United States of America’s nuclear policy toward the Republic of Korea through the prism of the bilateral agreements concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to explore a possible solution to the problem of the so��called nuclear asymmetry from a historical and global perspective. A series of the nuclear energy agreement made between the two countries represent the past, present, and future trajectory of U.S. nonproliferation and counterproliferation. In spite of considerable discussions and suggestions over the contents of the controversial agreement, the Republic of Korea has failed to achieve much progress toward a better common understanding and a possible solution of the not��even��cooperation with the United States. Thus the present study tries to re��examine the topic in a broader perspective that is both historical and global. While the troubled issue of the nuclear agreement has been with us for more than six decades, it has not been much studied from a global perspective, let alone historical one. This has much to do with the fact that most accounts of the nuclear pact have focused on the nuclear technologies and the legality of the agreement, which has eventually dwarfed or dampened the academic demands and enthusiasm in the field of political and international affairs. It is not surprising that the text of the bilateral nuclear agreement has been largely subsumed under other policies, underplayed, or even ignored. As the present problem of nuclear nonproliferation represented by enrichment and reprocessing is often portrayed as a post��Cold War priority, applied inconsistently and selectively by the U.S. strategic factors major causes and effects of the asymmetric nuclear agreement have to be studied in connection with the U.S. nonproliferation policy goals, which is understood as a core, long��standing, and driving goal of U.S. national interest. To accomplish this end (a selective or discretionary adoption of nonproliferation and national interest), in effect, the United States has to date developed and implemented a wide range of options, usually applied in a variety of combination, which might be regarded as the “strategies of inhibition.” It is hard to point out that the United States has applied these tools to its allies (South Korea included) in a strictly fair manner, even if they have been motivated in large measure by nonproliferation logic. Needless to say, the duality sheds light on the motivation behind U.S. efforts to ensure that the Republic of Korea should not develop a nuclear weapons capability, although the whole concept of double-standard, unless properly defined, can be nebulous simply because it is slippery and widely abused in the foreign policy lexicon. The duality of America is also a complex and messy concept, influenced by structural considerations, domestic and international politics, and the personality and preferences of individual presidents and their administrations. More strictly speaking, the term is not a rule book, but rather a set of arguments that need to be reacted to events or handling them on a case��by��case basis. That being said, the term(duality) is, per se, a purposeful set of arguments about what the U.S. seeks to accomplish in the world. It is thus necessary to have a systematic analysis of interrelationship between the U.S. nonproliferation and its national interest for the solution to the persistent and long��standing problem. In order to explain the discrepancies of the much��debated agreement and to explore a possible solution to the duality of the U.S. nuclear policy, this study may be seen in the context of the so��called value alliance. This includes treaties; norms; diplomacy; alliances and security guarantees; information; intelligence; export controls; missile defense; preemptive counterforce nuclear postures and sanctions. In fact, when dealing with the United States with regard to the revision of the nuclear agreement in 2015, South Korea has failed not only to defend its interests but also to ‘engage’ in U.S. domestic politics to alter the way that South Korea pursues its interests. Exploring the double standard of the U.S. is important for the following reason: the history of duality often demanded that the United States work against the Republic of Korea, inserting a critical and missing variable into debates over the causes of nuclear nonproliferation. Scholarly treatments that focus on factors such as political leadership, regime type, norms and treaties, and the regional security environment of the potential proliferator often overlook the powerful influence of the U.S. nonproliferation on when and why the Republic of Korea makes its decisions about enrichment and reprocessing. This study proceeds as follows. The first and second chapters define duality, lay out the basic contours of the well��known international relation theories, previous major studies, and highlight several important U.S. policies in the nuclear age that only a few scholars can fully explain. The third chapter outlines the duality of the United States revealed in the implementation process of both the nuclear agreements (Japan, India and Vietnam) and nonproliferation (South Africa and Libya) as well as the duality of the United States’nuclear ‘Gold Standard.’The fourth chapter explores the importance and implications of the South Korea��U.S. nuclear agreements made and revised in 1956 and 1974, respectively, both for understanding the past situation surrounding the Korean peninsula. In the same chapter, it is explained that why the United States time and again has pressured South Korea to eschew independent nuclear forces while providing the so��called nuclear umbrella with its military ally. In the fifth chapter as an empirical support of this theoretical explanation, a case study of the 2015 nuclear agreement is undertaken. This case study employs data and policy analyses mainly taken from publications of Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of South Korea, Korean newss, and the U.S. publications. It is hoped that this case study will contribute to general discussion of a better nuclear agreement. The sixth chapter explains how both the defunct nuclear security summit, initiated by the Obama administration, and global nonproliferation governance have helped to mitigate the duality of the United States, which has been often (though not always) applied to other countries, such as South Korea and Japan, differently. Taken together, the duality of the United States explains much about its nonproliferation policy, as strongly evidenced by the first adoption of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons at the United Nations General Assembly in June, 1968. It can fundamentally account for the high priority that the United States has placed on slowing, reversing, and mitigating the spread of nuclear weapons, although it is precisely difficult to argue that the United States has applied its nonproliferation policy to South Korea, with a full regard for its economic or political orientation, geographic location, or power��political status. Nevertheless, it is obvious that duality is not the only explanation for the U.S. nonproliferation policy; often, it has intertwined with economic factors. This duality logic is at work in U.S. nonproliferation policy today. The policy of nuclear nonproliferation helps explain not only the persistence of the United States’ efforts to keep South Korea from acquiring the nuclear weapons program but also its long��held motivation. The ideological orientation of the government in South Korea cannot be the primary driver that the U.S. should consider permitting South Korea to enrich or/and to reprocess. In 2015, South Kore and the U.S. have successfully revised the nuclear pact in a more ‘practical and productive’manner. What is the future of the nuclear agreement? South Korea is at a point where its power and ability to upgrade the relationship with the U.S. are widely seen as ‘challenging,’ and where more ‘aggressive’ foreign policies from the incoming Donald Trump administration are highly expected. Yet the potential for the nuclear cooperation in terms of pragmatism is still present. And South Korea can gain more through persistent diplomacy and cooperative solutions than through aggressive confrontation or by pursuing a negative form of nuclear sovereignty. The debates over the future of the nuclear cooperation will be continued until policymakers and scholars address the uncertainty of nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula and beyond. ，韩语论文网站，韩语论文 |
