Although Wittgenstein, Gadamer, and Derrida approach to different aspects of play, they share a fundamental common opinion on various philosophical issues. Just as “play” is always renewed in its multiplicity, dynamicity, and automaticity, languag... Although Wittgenstein, Gadamer, and Derrida approach to different aspects of play, they share a fundamental common opinion on various philosophical issues. Just as “play” is always renewed in its multiplicity, dynamicity, and automaticity, language, art, sign, world, etc., are realized by itself constantly according to their own internal rules and do not rely on other external reality. This claim results in a critique of the modern metaphysics that attempts to base all knowledge on a pure and complete theoretical system. First, this study will explain how Wittgenstein, Gadamer, and Derrida can meet in one place through the concept of play (II). Second, this study will summarize the characteristics of modern metaphysics criticized by Wittgenstein, Gadamer, and Derrida as “foundationalism,” “representationalism,” and “subjectivism” (III). Third, this study will discuss the concepts of play of Wittgenstein, Gadamer, and Derrida in terms of “multiplicity of play” (Ⅳ), “dynamicity of play” (Ⅴ), and “automaticity of play” (Ⅵ). Fourth, this study will argue for “coherentism” against “foundationalism,” “hermeneutical truth” against “representational truth,” “intersubjectivity” against “subjectivity” (Ⅶ). Ⅱ. Wittgenstein, Gadamer, and Derrida intend to renew today’s philosophy through the concept of play. They claim that languages, arts, sign, and worlds, like “play,” perform their own internal rules every time, and freely develop themselves without relying on any reality. A comprehensive understanding of the concept of play is needed to compare the discussions from different contexts. The classical research that Huizinga achieved in the field of cultural history is very beneficial in that it satisfies this problem. First, I will outline a discussion of the nature and significance of Huizinga’s play (Ⅱ. 1.). Second, I will note that Huizinga rejects the dichotomy of “play/seriousness,” “ordinary/unordinary,” “fiction/reality,” and “uselessness/usefulness” by explaining the character of play (Ⅱ. 2.). Third, I will point out that Wittgenstein, Gadamer, and Derrida also criticize the dichotomy of “language/world,” “creator/enjoyer,” and “signifier/signified” based on the concept of play (Ⅱ. 3.). Ⅲ. Since Descartes presented the famous “cogito” proposition, “I think, therefore I am,” human beings appear in the history of philosophy as a one who subsists the world. The modern metaphysical thought, which is called “philosophy of consciousness,” is based on a set of premises. The philosophy that emphasizes self-reflection of the subject considers what is given directly to consciousness as the epistemological foundation to support all other knowledge. We represent the world by establishing the system of sciences on the basis of the Given. The criterion of evaluating “true” and “false” of the representation is the subjective certainty. In the course of this discussion, modern metaphysics is bound to the problems of “philosophy of consciousness” by accepting the dichotomy of “subject/object” self-evidently. First, I will show that Descartes and Locke, representatives of rationalism and empiricism, wander between “subjectivism” and “objectivism” without properly explaining the relationship between subject and object (Ⅲ. 1.). Second, I will criticize Kant, who explores transcendental conditions that make experience possible, still not out of the bounds of philosophy of consciousness (Ⅲ. 2.). Third, I will point out that the attempt of modern metaphysics to bridge the gap between subject and object is developed on the epistemological framework of “foundationalism,” “representationalism,” and “subjectivism” (Ⅲ. 3.). Ⅳ. Wittgenstein focuses on the “multiplicity” of play against the dichotomy of “language/world.” He presents the concept of the “language-play” to criticize attempts to reduce language to a single logical form. German “Spiel” can be translated into “game” or “play.” G. E. M. Anscombe translates “Sprachspiel” as “language-game,” but this study translates it into “language-play” for the unification of notation. Language, like play, develops itself in myriad forms based on each internal rule. It is not possible to attempt to explain the grammar of the ordinary language as a more fundamental logic, for there is no universal order that can be applied to all plays. First, I will summarize the “picture theory of language” which explores the conditions under which sentences acquire meaning (Ⅳ. 1.). Second, I will criticize the fact that the “picture theory of language” overlooks multiplicity of play through the “play theory of language” (Ⅳ. 2.). Third, I will discuss how the “play theory of language” presents a new thought to overcome the dichotomy of “language/world” (Ⅳ. 3.). Ⅴ. Gadamer focuses on the “dynamicity” of play against the dichotomy of “creator/enjoyer.” He presents the concept of the “play as the mode of being of the work of art itself” to criticize attempts to attribute meaning of art to the creator or the enjoyer. Art, like play, constantly realizes itself in self-expression which is newly repeated all the time. It is not possible to attempt to completely determine a work of art through a subjective experience of a moment, for the to-and-fro movement in play cannot be controlled by a person who participated in the play. First, I will examine “aesthetics of genius” and “Erlebniskunst (art based on experience)” which understand a work of art based on the aesthetic experience of creator and enjoyer (Ⅴ. 1.). Second, I will criticize the fact that “aesthetics of genius” and “Erlebniskunst” overlook the dynamicity of play through the concept of the “play as the mode of being of the work of art itself” (Ⅴ. 2.). Third, I will discuss how the concept of the “play as the mode of being of the work of art itself” presents a new thought to overcome the dichotomy of “creator/enjoyer” (Ⅴ. 3.). Ⅵ. Derrida focuses on the “automaticity” of play against the dichotomy of “signifier/signified.” He presents the “play of signifiers without signifieds” to criticize attempts to explain sign as the structure of auto-affection of speech. Signs, like play, do not depend on any other reality. It is not possible to end the infinite chain of signifiers formed by supplement with a vivid presence, for the foundation that gives meaning to play cannot be suggested from the outside of the play. First, we will review the “logocentrism,” which compares the relationship between signifier and signified to the relationship between writing and speech. Second, we will criticize the fact that “logocentrism” neglects the automaticity of play through the concept of the “play of signifiers without signifieds.” Third, we will discuss how the concept of the “play of signifiers without signifieds” presents a new thought to overcome the dichotomy of “signifier/signified.” Ⅶ. Wittgenstein, Gadamer, and Derrida focus on “multiplicity,” “dynamicity,” and “automaticity” of play. Play is an activity aimed at fun through the process of performance renewing itself based on the internal rule. Language, art, sign, and world, like play, do not depend on any reality as they are constantly formed in accordance with their own justification. This thought criticizes the project of the modern metaphysics to perfectly represent all beings in the consciousness from the most fundamental foundations to reach certainty. Through the concept of play, we can get a new understanding of language, art, sign, and world beyond the epistemological framework of “foundationalism,” “representationalism,” and “subjectivism.” First, I will claim “coherentism” against “foundationalism.” Second, I will claim “hermeneutical truth” against “representational truth.” Third, I will claim “intersubjectivity” against “subjectivity.”
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